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Articles
THE DECREASING ONTOLOGICAL DENSITY OF THE STATE IN
CATHOLIC SOCIAL DOCTRINE
PATRICK MCKINLEY BRENNAN*

"There are a hundred reasons for opposition to the natural law,
but this is one of them and at certain times it may be the strongest: obligation in natural law does not hold unless the natural law
exists in a state which is actually prior, but which is ultimate in
the order of discovery-'this law is an aspect of God."'
-Yves R. Simon 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

IGNITATIS humane personae hac nostra aetate:" With

these

I).words the fathers of the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) began
the "Declaration on Religious Liberty," DignitatisHumanae (1965): "In our
day men are becoming increasingly conscious of the dignity of the human
person." More than four decades have passed since the Council made this
claim on behalf of a dawning awareness of human dignity. Today, dignity
is the familiar fountainhead of post-conciliar Catholic social doctrine. Not
only the other conciliar documents, but the teaching documents of Pope
John Paul II, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, and the recent Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church alike make the dignity of the human
person a primary point of departure for practical reflection on man's life
in this world and beyond. In the words of the Compendium: "The Book of
Genesis provides us with certain foundations of Christian anthropology:
the inalienable dignity of the human person, the roots and guarantee of
,,2
which are found in God's design of creation ....
Less familiar than the train of thought I have just telescoped is one
currently under construction by the United States Supreme Court, according to which the fifty states of the union are each possessed of "sovereign
dignity." In a rambunctious series of cases decided over the last decade,
* Professor of Law and John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies,
Villanova University School of Law. I thank my colleagues Dean and Professor
Mark Sargent and Professor Michael Moreland, as well as Professor Rick Garnett
and Professor Robert Vischer, for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Erin Galbally and the support
of Villanova University School of Law.
1. YVES R. SIMON, THE TRADITION OF

2.

NATURAL LAW

139 (1965).

PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM

OF THE SOCIAL

DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH 37 (2004) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM].

(253)
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the Court has propounded and given effect to the view that the states "retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty."'3 In sum, it
is the judgment of the Supreme Court that states are immune to uncon-4
sented private suit thanks to their "sovereignty" and "sovereign dignity."
Some students of the Court have discounted the Court's jurisprudence of "sovereign dignity" and other (as one commentator has dubbed5
them) "big ideas" on the ground that they are mere "rhetorical flourish."
This is an ominous course of action when one pauses to notice that the
coercive effect given the Court's rhetoric leads to the denial of an otherwise required legal remedy to injured plaintiffs. Different language would
justify or call for a different course, perhaps one closer to a correspondence between legal right and legal remedy.
The denial of an otherwise enforceable remedy is not, however, the
leading reason for not blinking the Court's claims on behalf of sovereign
states: These ideas make progress in men's minds. As Russell Hittinger
has observed, "If we ask a modern person who or what is sovereign, he or
she would not say 'reason,' 'the individual,' or 'science,' but instead, without hesitation, 'the state."' 6 The Court's recent sovereignty and sovereign
dignity jurisprudence may, as I have argued elsewhere, 7 make hash of the
inherited understandings of Article III of the Constitution, of the Eleventh
Amendment thereto, and of the common law privilege by which the king
was immune to suit. At the same time, however, the Court's ontologically
baroque jurisprudence plays right into the modern mind described by Hittinger. The irony is thick. The state that by its own oracular confession is
axiologically incompetent to pass on questions of the good, turns out to be
free to declare itself sovereign-and no one arches an eyebrow. 8 The fact
that friends and less friendly critics tell me that the Supreme Court's essays
in the sovereignty and sovereign dignity of the United States and of the
fifty states are in service of the noble goal of "our federalism" just tends to
demonstrate that people are strangely comfortable with the idea that the
state is, in fact, possessed of sovereignty and is, therefore, the preeminent
locus of dignity. 9
3. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999); Patrick McKinley Brennan,
Against Sovereignty: A Cautionary Note on the Normative Power of the Actual, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 220 (2007).

4. See generally Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The exception is
when Congress acts under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or perhaps under
analogous sections of the other Reconstruction Amendments.
5. See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1011, 1040 (2000).
6. Russell Hittinger, Introductionto Modern Catholicism, in 1 THE TEACHINGS OF
MODERN CHRISTIANITY 3, 4 (John Witte Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2006).
7. See generally Brennan, supra note 3.

8. The mandatory cite is of course to the "mystery passage" in the per curiam
opinion in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), widely thought to have
been authored in Justice Kennedy's chambers. Id. at 851.

9. Though the Court has not, to my knowledge, explicated the point, it would
seem that the claim is that the state's sovereignty entails its (sovereign) dignity.
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Of course, whether the proposition that the state is sovereign and possessed of "sovereign dignity" should be judged correct depends on what
one means by "sovereign," and it is by no means a univocal term. There
was a time when the Church, united with the state, blessed the idea that
the state was a sacrum, a unity of order possessed of the dignity of a group
person in the image of God the sovereign ruler of the universe. In the
judgment of modern Catholic social doctrine, however, it is clear, and increasingly so, that the state is not "sovereign" in any ordinary meaning of
the term. Indeed, over the course of the last century-plus, the Church
gradually converged on the judgment that the state is a servant-instrument
of persons and of the societies in which they reach whatever perfection of
which they are capable. Though the state enjoys a certain dignity from its
end (the service of the common good of the body politic), the trend has
been "a steady deterioration of any ontological density to the state." 10 The
state has to "achieve its true dignity,"' " and this it would do by implementing the natural law, for the common good.
Until shortly ago, it would have been largely uncontroversial to observe that the state, though less ontologically thick than it used to be,
achieves its end by serving to implement the natural law, as life's contingencies require or allow. 12 The rub comes, though, when the state deems
itself not bound by the natural law, that is, when the state becomes absolute, ab-solutus, un-bound-the boast of the modern sovereign lionized by
Thomas Hobbes and his ideological descendants, and conjured by the Supreme Court in its incantations of sovereignty. 13 The Church laicized the
state on the understanding that the state would of course continue to be
bound by the natural law. The rub under which we live is a state that
considers itself free, indeed somehow obligated, to disregard the natural
14
law.
Until recently, one could count on the magisterium of the Church to
inveigh against states that proceed in derogation from the natural law, on
the ground that it is an abuse of their participated share in the divine
governance. Recently, however, Pope Benedict has struck a different balance. By not affirming that the state is possessed of access to-and is
10. See Hittinger, supra note 6, at 22.
11. SeeJACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE

STATE 19 (1951).
12. The state's responsibility to implement the natural law does not entail
"judicial activism," pace what some one hears from some contemporary conservatives. Regarding the limitations on a judge in a state committed to implementing
the natural law, see RUSSELL HITTINGER, THE FIRST GRACE 77, 115-33 (2003).
13. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999). In defending its claims on
behalf of state sovereignty, the Court explains that natural law is irrelevant:
In an apparent attempt to disparage a conclusion with which it disagrees,
the dissent attributes our reasoning to natural law. We seek to discover,
however, only what the Framers and those who ratified the Constitution
sought to accomplish when they created a federal system. We appeal to
no higher authority than the Charter which they wrote and adopted.
Id.
14. See Hittinger, supra note 6, at 29-31.
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bound by-the natural law that is a participatedshare in the eternal law, by not

teaching that the state makes positive law by legislating in accordance with
or giving determination/specification to the received law, Pope Benedict
has allowed a question about the legal basis of the state's authority to
make law.
There will be much more to say about this, but first nota bene. This
paper does not make the patently false claim that Benedict commends or
acknowledges a state founded, as it were, on relativism. Pope Benedict
XVI's teaching on society and state are conspicuous for their insistence
that we, no matter who we are, must take our social bearings from objective reason. 15 Nor does Pope Benedict not affirm the existence of something called "natural law." Rather, my claim is that in the writings of
Cardinal Ratzinger and now Pope Benedict, the state appears no longer to
be part of the divine legal governance. As Benedict describes the state, it
undertakes to make law and does indeed produce something that we refer
to as "law," but it does so without first having received (the natural) law
that is truly law. My question is this: How can a state that has no access to
law proceed to make law, without being itself lawless?
In Part II, I outline the understanding of law, state, and society advanced in the 2005 encyclical letter Deus Caritas,Pope Benedict's first major teaching document. Parts III and IV chronicle the proximate
background against which Benedict was writing, calling attention to ways
in which Deus Caritasseeks to amend or emend relevant facets of the tradition descending from Pope Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum to
John Paul II's celebration of its centenary in the encyclical Centesimus Annus. Part V provides a summary statement of the classical twentieth-century Catholic statement on man, state, and society, relying principally on
the work of Jacques Maritain (1882-1973). On that account, the instrumentalist state, no longer ontologically baroque, is the servant of men and
women who implement the natural law through pluriform societies, including political society served by the state. The burden of the final two
sections is to show several ways in which Cardinal Ratzinger and Pope Benedict deviate from the classical instrumentalist state articulated by Maritain
and others, and deliver in its stead a state whose positive "laws" lack divine
legal warrant.
II.

A

FIRST STATEMENT OF THE SOCIAL ORDER ACCORDING TO

"DEUS CARITAS EST"

The encyclical Deus Caritas comes to consider the condition of the
state by way of meeting the Marxist's old objection to the Church's historical performance of and encouragement of works of charity. 1 6 In an encyc15. See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRISIS OF CULTURES 4749 (2005); JOSEPH RATZINGER, WITHOUT RoOTS 127-31 (2006); JOSEPH RATZINGER,
VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL 27-29 (2006).
16. See generally BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DEus CARITAS EsT (2005).
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lical conceived to encourage ecclesial and individual Christians' acts of
charity, the Pope concedes that there is "some truth" to the objection that
the proliferation of acts of charity can tend to preserve a status quo of
dependency and injustice. The Pope's first characterization of the end of
the state occurs in this context, and is as follows: "It is true that the pursuit
ofjustice must be a fundamental norm of the state and that the aim (finis)
of ajust social order is to guarantee to each person, according to the principle of subsidiarity (principiosubsidiarietatis), his share of the community's
goods." 17 In adding a layer to the inherited body of social doctrine, Benedict thus begins by teaching that the end of what we call in English the
state, for which Benedict's Latin is civitas, is the creation of a just social
order. The state is not an end in itself. "Politics," the Pope continues, has
as "its fundamental task (munus) the just ordering of society and the
state."' 8 The Pope goes on immediately to quote Augustine's aphorism
according to which a civitas "not governed according to justice would be
just a bunch of thieves."' 19 Benedict elaborates:
Justice is both the aim (finis) and the intrinsic criterion of all
politics. Politics is more than a simple, technical art for defining
the rules of public life: its origin and goal are found in justice,
which by its very nature has to do with ethics. So the state cannot
avoid the question: how is justice to be achieved here and now?
But this question presupposes an even more radical one: What is
justice? This is a question of practical reason, but, if reason is to
20
be exercised properly, it must undergo constant purification.
Here, Benedict continues, "politics and faith meet."'2' According to
the Pope, "Faith," "an encounter with the living God," "liberates reason
from its blind spots" and thus helps it "to see its proper object more
clearly." 2 2 "This is where Catholic social doctrine has its place," the Pope
explains. 23 It does not "give the Church power over the state," let alone
"impose on those who do not share the faith ways of thinking and modes
of conduct proper to faith." 24 In sum: "Its aim is simply to help purify
reason and to contribute, here and now, to the acknowledgment and attainment of what isjust."2 5 Lest there be any ambiguity about basis of the

teaching: "The Church's social doctrine argues on the basis of reason and
the natural law, that is, on the basis of what is in accord with the nature of
the human person," "a ratione et a naturali iure, id est ab eo quod congruit
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

26.
28.
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naturae cuiusque personae humanae."26 We shall have to return to this re-

markable formulation in due course.
Next, continuing to develop his thesis about the insufficiency of justice, both as motivator and as end, the Pope explains: "There is no ordering of the State so just that it can eliminate the need for a service of
love." 27 Benedict continues, further characterizing the state: "The State
which would provide everything, absorbing everything into itself, would
ultimately become a mere bureaucracy incapable of guaranteeing the very
thing the suffering person-every person-needs: namely, loving personal
concern." 28 Finally, in giving his most concrete indication of what the
state can and should be, the Pope reintroduces, and for the first time in
the encyclical gives flesh to the bones of, the principle of subsidiarity: "We
do not need a state which regulates and controls everything, but a State
which, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, generously acknowledges and supports initiatives arising from the different social forces
(ex variis socialibus viribus) and combines spontaneity with closeness to

those in need." 29 The Church herself, the Pope immediately adds, "is one
30
of those living forces."
In sum: The encyclical teaches that human persons engage in politics
in order to secure justice and also to allow opportunities for charity. The
social forces in which persons are united, for example in the Church, are
to be acknowledged and encouraged. This is part of the role of the state,
and a state that ignored or dissolved those bonds by substituting itself in
their place would violate the principle of subsidiarity. Though properly
ecclesial acts of charity must never be confused for acts of the state, the
Pope concludes, quoting the Catechism of the Catholic Church, that "charity

must animate the entire lives of the lay faithful and therefore also their
political activity, lived as 'social charity,'" a term of art Benedict receives
from Pius XI. 3 1 Succinctly: "The mission of the lay faithful is ...to config-

ure social life correctly" and realize the conditions of the "'common
good.'"32 This is "the world of politics," in which the Church herself has
only an "indirect office," that of purifying reason and "reawakening ...
those moral forces without which just structures are neither established
33
nor prove effective in the long run."

26. Id.

27. Id.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 1 29.
Id.
Id.
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THE SOCIAL ORDER IN THE PROXIMATE TRADITION:

LEO XIII

In turning now to ask what Benedict has added to or subtracted from
the tradition, which disputed questions he has resolved and which he has
exacerbated, the place to begin is Pope Leo XIII's social encyclicals, the
first papal contribution to what Pope Pius XI (r. 1922-39) termed, in his
1931 encyclical QuadragesimoAnno, "social ... doctrine." 34 Benedict cred-

its Leo with ending the papal magisterium's neglect to study individuals'
needs in radically changed social circumstances, above all in his landmark
encyclical Rerum Novarum. Among that encyclical's novel and more or less
enduring contributions are an articulation of the rights of workers (e.g.,
time off, limited hours) and an affirmation of the validity of workers' associations, the forerunners of today's trade unions. (Oddly from today's
vantage point, Leo reaches novel rights of workers to associate from an
analysis of family society and of the natural right to property). In affirming workers' rights to associate themselves, and apart from management, the encyclical rejected the so-called "corporatist" position that
would have sanctioned exclusively hierarchical associations composed of
both management and workers. 35 This was a bold and hard-won development; it was, in a word, modern.
In its assumptions and expressions about the essence of the state itself, however, Leo's encyclical is, in its essentials, utterly traditional, which
is to say, committed to an ontologically dense state. Like all subsequent
encyclicals that consider the state, Rerum Novarum declines to endorse any
particular form(s) of government. "By the State," Leo wrote in Rerum

Novarum, "we here understand, not the particular form of government
36
prevailing in this or that nation, but the State as rightly apprehended."
The exact form is not specified; "the State as rightly apprehended is ...
any government conformable in its institutions to right reason and natural
law, and to those dictates of the divine reason .... -37 More specifically,
Leo taught that because God the author of nature "wills that man should
live in society," that is, that it is in man's nature to associate in (among
other forms) civil society, and further because "a society can neither exist
nor be conceived in which there is no one to govern the wills of individuals," "God has willed that in civil society there should be some to rule the
multitude." 38 Leo never lets his reader lose sight of the "the divine origin
34. Pius XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER QUADRAGESIMO ANNO
21 (1931). See also
Mary Elsbernd, PapalStatements on Rights: A Historical Contextual Study of Encyclical
Teachingfrom Pius VI-Pius XI (1791-1939)587 n.1 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of Leuven) (on file with author).
35. Thomas A. Shannon, Commentary on Rerum Novarum, in MODERN CATHOLIC
Soci TEACHING 127, 145-46 (Kenneth R. Himes et al. eds., 2004).
36. LEO X1II, ENCYCLICAL LETrER RERum NOVARUm
XIII, ENCYLCIcAL LETTER Immortale Dei 29 (1885)).

32 (1891)

(citing LEO

37. Id.
38. LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DiUTURNUM

11 (1881).
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of all authority."3 9 The people designate the ruler; they in no way confer
ruling authority. 40 "[N]o man has in himself or of himself the power of
constraining the free will of others by fetters of authority [that calls for
obedience]. This power resides solely [(unice)] in God, the Creator and
Legislator of all things; and it is necessary that those who exercise it should
do it as having received it from God. '41 Leo's state is ontologically dense
because it is nothing short of a participation or reception of, or participation in, divine ruling power.
Post-Leonine magisterial teachings do not deny that all authority is
from God, but whereas many subsequent magisterial and other Catholic
theories argued that such authority passed from God to civil leaders by way
of the people (the so-called transmission or translation theory, first developed by Jesuits in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), Leo himself
stayed far away from this theory. 42 No doubt Leo realized that the theory
lends itself to the misunderstanding that ruling power is from man, not
from God. On Leo's account of man, state and society, all authority emanates from God alone, and very clearly so. Says Leo, quoting Romans 13:1:
"[C]ivil power, considered as such, is from God, always from God: 'For
43
there is no power but from God.'"
How does God give civil power or ruling authority to man? Leo's answer to this question flows from his Thomistic understanding of the natural law. Before I describe that understanding, it cannot be said
emphatically enough that Leo's concept of the natural law differs toto caelo
from most conceptions of the same that are debated today, especially the
one popularized by John Finnis, Germaine Grisez, and Joseph Boyle, as
well as, to pick another example, the revisionist reading of Aquinas advanced by Anthony Lisska. 44 While I cannot here give anything approaching an adequate description, let alone defense, of the teaching on natural
law that St. Thomas developed and Leo in due course appropriated, one
can, in rather short order, highlight the essentials that distinguish it from
the later declension. The most conspicuous element is that for Thomas
and Leo it's law all the way up and all the way down, as it were. The
foundation of Leo's account of man, society and the state, and specifically
of the power to make positive law, is man's natural law participation in the
eternal law. "The theme of law is paramount to Leo's understanding of
39. LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER AETERNI PATRIS 29 (1879).
40. See, LEO XIII, DiUTURNUM, supra note 38, 5-7.
41. Id. 11.
42. For a compendious exploration of the transmission theory, see YVES R.
GOVERNMENT 157-79 (1951).
43. POPE LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER Au MILIEU DES SOLLICITUDES
18
(1892). On Leo's not having ruled out the translation/transmission theory, see
HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT 469-71 (1945).
44. See, e.g., ANTHONY LIssKA, AQOUINAS'S THEORY OF NATURAL LAw: AN ANALYriC RECONSTRUCTION (1996);John Finnis, Germain Grisez &Joseph Boyle, PractiSIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC

cal Principals,Moral Truth and UltimateEnds, 32 AM.J.JUuvs. 99 (1987). See generally,
P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAw (1999).

ROBERT
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how human persons and their works stand within God's ordering
45
wisdom."
According to Thomas, to whom Leo turned, the natural law and the
eternal law are not "diverse," or entirely different, from each other. In
question 91, article 2 of the Summa Theologiae,which asks whether there is
a natural law (and of course answers in the affirmative), Thomas replies to
one of the objections as follows: "This argument would hold, if the natural
law were something diverse from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but
a participation thereof. '46 This formulation recalls the thesis of the preceding corpus of the article:
Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine
providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a
share of providence, by being both provident for itself and for
others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby
it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this
participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called
the natural law. .... 47
After further analysis, Thomas concludes: "It is therefore evident that the
natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the
eternal law."48 Consistently, when considering laws other than the eternal
law, such as the divine positive law, Thomas omits mention of the natural
law. 49 This is because, on his view, the natural law is not other than the
eternal law. "The [natural] law is called natural according to the mode of
promulgation and reception, not the pedigree of legislation." 50 The natural law is the "eternal law.., instilled ...in us so as to be known naturally
[naturaliter]."51 God promulgates the natural law in us, and, having received it, we are to abide by it in our individual and collective living.
Just how the reception of the natural law occurs in the rational person
is a complex question, vigorously disputed among otherwise mutually congenial Thomists. Some emphasize the rational quality of the knowledge,
while others, such as Jacques Maritain, stress the way in which the knowledge is through inclination or connaturality. We need not settle or even
further clarify the issue for the present purpose. The cardinal point, from
the point of view of the Leonine-Thomistic account of law and the state, is
this:
45. Russell Hittinger, Pope Leo XIII (1810-1903), in I
ERN CHRISTIANITY,

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

THE TEACHINGS OF MOD-

supra note 6, at 48.

THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

Q. 91,

art.

2.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g.,
id. at Q. 93, art. 3.
HITTINGER, supra note 12, at 97.
Id.
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Every created intelligence not only has a competence to make
judgments, but to make judgments according to a real law-indeed, a law that is the form and pattern of all other laws. Thus,
the legal order of things does not begin with an acquired virtue,
possessed by a few; nor does it begin with the offices and statutes
of human positive law; nor does it begin with the law revealed at
Sinai. God speaks the law, at least in its rudiments, to every intel52
ligent creature.
In short, having received a law, man can proceed to make more law, in
conformity with the received law. This is the consequence of the natural
53
law's being the rational creature's participation in the eternal law.
Turning from Thomas himself to Leo's appropriation of the Thomist
doctrine for purposes of articulating a papal theory of man, society and
the state, we find Leo maintaining that all power of governance derives

from God "as from a natural and necessary principle." 54 This "necessary
principle" is the eternal law, of which the natural law is the human person's first participation of God's (sole) governance of the universe. 55 On
Leo's model, those whom the people have designated to rule participate,
as do all people, in the eternal law; those designated to rule by law possess
authority over political society, and through law give it the order it should
have. Leo explains:
[A] uthority is the one and only foundation of all law-the power,
that is, of fixing duties and defining rights, [and so forth]. But.
all this, clearly, cannot be found in man, if, as his own supreme
legislator, he is to be the [supreme] rule of his own actions. It
follows, therefore, that the law of nature is the same thing as the
eternal law, implanted in rational creatures, and inclining them to
their right action and end; and can be nothing else but the eternal
56
reason of God, the Creator and Ruler of all the world.

52. Id. at 98. By way of intellectual autobiography, I should say that while it

was Russell Hittinger's work on St. Thomas that finally convinced me of this reading of Thomas on law, it was the dissertation of Stephen Louis Brock, which he was
completing at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto in the late
1980s while I was a student there, that first and most comprehensively made the
case for me, and I have relied on it here. See Stephen Louis Brock, The Legal Character of Natural Law According to St. Thomas Aquinas (June 24, 1988) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto) (on file with author); see also James P.
Reilly, Jr., Saint Thomas on Law, 5-6, 12-17 (The Etienne Gilson Lecture, 1988).
Reilly was one of Brock's dissertation directors.
53. Not every human judgment reached in conformity with the natural law is
itself a law, however. In order for a person to make law, he or she must be duly
charged with the common good. A parent can and should judge according to the
natural law, but the parent's binding practical judgment is not a "law" for the
child. See HrrINGER, supra note 12, at 100.
54. LEO XIII, DIUTURNUM, supra note 38, 5.
55. See Russell Hittinger, The Problem of the State in Centesimus Annus, 15 FORDHAM INr'L L.J. 952 (1992).
56. LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER LIBERTAS
5 (1888).
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263

Leo's state is ontologically dense, because it is caught up in and is a
consequence of the divine rule of the cosmos. "[F]or Leo, the broad metaphysical and theological scheme remained that of a divine commonwealth in which the political state had as its principle and end the
imitation (however imperfectly) of God. The state, [Leo] said, is a 'likeness and symbol as it were of the Divine Majesty.' By dint of participation
57
in God's governance, its ruling powers properly can be called 'sacred."
According to Leo, "in civil society, God has always willed that there should
be a ruling authority [principatus], and that they who are invested with it

should reflect the divine power and providence in some measure over the
human race." 58 The state is no mere instrument, but a reflection of the
divine sovereignty. All ruling power is ad imaginem Dei.59
The ontological density of Leo's state comes into further focus as we
zero in on the fact that, for Leo, the Church and the state have the same
source of authority and, in fact, a similar mode of possessing it. Both
come directly from God, and if there be greater latitude in terms of how
authority is to be possessed in the state than in the Church, still "[t]he
60
state was to be the moral mirror of the [C]hurch in the secular realm."
The Church was the superior society, the societas perfecta, but the state, its
moral mirror, enjoyed the exalted function of assisting the Church in making men moral and getting them to Heaven.
Leo's paternalistic state, for all its undeniable ontological density, is
emphatically not, however, totalizing or totalitarian. The state is limited.
The state-or we might say, with precision that is not Leo's, political society (or the body politic) under civil authority-is limited, first of all, by the
supernatural society that is the Church.6 1 Indeed, as a matter of history, a
principal reason for Leo's concern with the state was to see that the
Church was left freedom and room to fulfill her mission. (In the Leonine
prayers that used to follow Low Mass, the faithful and their clergy prayed
for "the freedom of ...

Holy Mother the Church").

Also limiting the state, moreover, are the societies that are "roughhewn by nature" 62 itself, preeminently political society, marriage, and the
family. 63 Not only these societies whose forms are given (the Church's
supernaturally, the family's both naturally and supernaturally), but also
those that humans create, as time and circumstance allow or demand,
based on "the natural tendency of man to dwell in society" bound the
state. 64 For example: sodalities and unions and schools, as well as monas57. Hittinger, supra note 55, at 965 (internal footnotes omitted).
58. LEO XIII, IMMORTALE DEi, supra note 36, 4.
59. See LEO XIII, ENCYCLIcAL LETrER QUOD APOSTOLICt MUNERiS 1 6 (1878).
60. Elsbernd, supra note 34, at 266.
61. See, LEO XIII, RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 36, 53. See generally, LEO
XIII, Diuturnum, supra note 38.
62. MARITAIN, supra note 11, at 4.
63. See LEO XIII, RERuM NOVARUM, supra note 36, 51.
64. Id.
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teries and religious orders such as the Carthusians, the Augustinians, and
the Jesuits. These, too, the state must respect and not absorb. In sum, the
ontological abundance of such smaller societies, each a participated share
in the divine rule, both gives density to civil society under legitimate authority which, as it were, contains them, and, correlatively, places limits on
the authority that rules civil society, for it recognizes authority that is not
the state's.
Finally, (and this would almost go without saying except that it is exactly what the modern liberal democracies have forgotten or denied),
even within its legitimate sphere of action, the state is limited by the fact
that it cannot obligate or (except on prudential grounds) permit conduct
that would violate the natural (or the divine positive) law. 65 Obviously,
this is entailed by all ruling authority's being man's natural law sharing in
the divine ruling power, according to which, as Leo says, "[God] disposes
all things sweetly [suaviter], because to all things He gives forms and powers inclining them to that which He Himself moves them, so that they tend
toward it not by force, but as if it were by their own free accord." 6 6 The
sweeping picture is one of God sweetly leading rational creatures to their
ends through the internal communication of obligation to be responded
to in freedom exercised to implement the content of that obligation.
Not to put the point too sharply, a state whose authorities both can be
and are obligated to judge according to a participated share in the divine
rule, according to law imbued in man's very own nature, does not profess,
as the Supreme Court did in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a judicially enforceable "right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life." 6 7 This is a principal point
to which we must return after assessing Benedict's encyclical's capacity to
address it, but first we should lay out more of the structure that Benedict
inherited.

IV.

THE SOCIAL ORDER IN THE PROXIMATE TRADITION:

FROM PIUS XI TO JOHN PAUL II

Moving ahead forty years from Leo's publication of Rerum Novarum, to
Pope Pius XI's celebration, application, and development of the same in
Quadragesimo Anno, we reach the high-water mark of the papal effort to
create a neo-Thomist synthesis respecting Church, state, and society.
"[T] he most significant and vital part of [QuadragesimoAnno was] the reestablishment of a truly Christian social order[,]" 6 8 which Pius sketches,
65. See LEO XIII, DiuTuRNUM, supra note 38, 15; LEO XIII, LIBERTAS, supra
note 56, 1 42; see also Elsbernd, supra note 34, at 264.
66. LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER AETERNI PATRIS, 2 (1879).
67. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
68. 2 SoCIAL WELLSPRINGS: EIGHTEEN ENCYCLICALS OF
BY POPE Pius XI 205 n.25 (Joseph Husslein ed., 1942).
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quoting St. Paul to the Church at Ephesus, in organic terms that are evocative of Leo:
If the members of the body social.., are ... reconstituted, and if
the directing principle of economic-social life is restored, it will
be possible to say in a certain sense even of this body what the
Apostle says of the mystical body of Christ: "The whole body (being closely joined and knit together through every joint of the
system according to the functioning in due measure of each sin'69
gle part) derives its increase to the building up of itself in love."
As this language makes unmistakably clear, Pius does not eschew the
traditional thesis according to which membership in the hierarchical body
of the state constitutes an ontological perfection of the person. However,
QuadragesimoAnno does take a large step toward the "instrumentalist" view
of the state that Pius XI's successor, Pius XII, would advance in 1939, a
month after the invasion of Poland. The principal contribution of Pius XI
to the Catholic understanding of man, society and the state was to affirm
and emphasize a social order rich in diverse societies or associations that,
as for Leo, limit the state. Pius affirms the following limits on the emergent modern state:
When we speak of the reform of institutions, the State comes
chiefly to mind, not as if universal well-being were to be expected
of its activity, but because things have come to such a pass
through the evil of what we have termed "individualism" that, following upon the overthrow and near extinction of that rich social
life that was once highly developed through associations of various kinds, there remain virtually only individuals and the State.
This is to the great harm of the State itself; for, with a structure of
social governance lost, and the taking over of all the burdens
which the wrecked associations once bore, the State has been
70
overwhelmed and crushed by almost infinite tasks and duties.
In the next paragraph of the encyclical, after conceding that changed
circumstances indicate that what was once done by small associations may
indeed have to be performed by larger associations, Pius announces:
That most weighty principle, which cannot be set aside or
changed, [and which] remains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy: Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what
they can accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give
it to the community, so also is it an injustice and at the same time
a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater
and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations
can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish
69. Pius XI,
70. Id. 78.

QuADRAGEslMo ANNO,

supra note 34,

90.
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help to the members
of the body social, and never destroy and
71
absorb them.

This, of course, is the classic formulation of what is known as the principle
of subsidiarity, to which Pius gives additional expression in the succeeding
paragraph:
[T] hose in power should be sure that the more perfectly a graduated order is kept among the various associations, in observance
of the principle of "subsidiary function," the stronger social authority and effectiveness will be the happier and more prosper72
ous the condition of the State.
What Pius describes as a fixed and unshaken principle of social philosophy had never been mentioned by name, let alone defined, in a prior
encyclical, nor would St. Thomas, whose philosophy guided Leo XIII and
Pius XI, have quite recognized it, though one can regard it as a legitimate
development of inherited Thomistic principles, in response to modern social problems. Pius received the principle of "subsidiary function" or, as it
came to be called, subsidiarity, from the work of the Italian Jesuit Thomist
Luigi Taparelli, whose self-appointed task it was, in the context of the midnineteenth century unification in Italy, to oppose, based true on Thomistic principles, not only the overtly dangerous doctrines of Hobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau, but also those of such slippery thinkers as Burlamaqui,
73
Pufendorf, and Grotius.
Taparelli's original work is thick with neologisms, including the Italian phrase, dritto ipotattico, the second word of which corresponds to the
Greek hypotaxis, which refers to the modalities of coordination among the
clauses of a sentence. Etymologically, it means "to sit under," and of this
the Latin equivalent is sub sedeo, from which the Latin substantive is subsidiarium. As one scholar explains:
The Latin expression subsidia [the plural of subsidium] applied,
then, not just to mean "help" but in the first instance to auxiliary
troops with the Roman legion, as they "sat below" ready in reserve to support the battle. The "help" in this context is from the
bottom up, not from the top down, as the inferior and mediating
groups all participate in achieving the common good of the more
74
perfect association.
Rather than, as is often supposed, a principle of devolution or lowest level
function, in magisterial Catholic social doctrine, subsidiarity is a principle
71. Id.
72. Id.

79.
80.

73. See Thomas Behr, Luigi TaparelliD'Azeglio, S.J and the Development of Scholastic Natural Law Thought as a Science of Society and Politics,J. MARKETS & MORALITY

99, 101 (2003).
74. Id. at 105.
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of respect, ordering, coordination, and, as necessary, help among plural
societies, viz., the supernatural society that is the Church, those that come
"rough-hewn" by nature, and that those that men create through intelligence and will, for good purposes. The principle of subsidiarity both limits
the powers of those possessed of civil authority and recognizes their given
functions.
The social landscape that is the focus of Quadragesimo Anno can be
described as one of pluralism. Pius certainly did not imagine for a moment
that legitimate authorities could be set up and give effect to what violates
the natural or divine law; there exist no pockets of blessed derogation
from man's natural law participation in the eternal law. There exist, however, plural societies, each of which, if functioning half decently, is possessed of its own genuine authority, through its participated governing
share in the eternal law. The authority of the parent in and over the family, the authority of the bishop in and over the particular church, the authority of the president in and over the sodality, the authority of the abbot
in and over the abbey and its monks-these are plural authorities that,
though subject to apt regulation by the state with a view to the common
good of all (individuals and their respective societies), precede the state,
with which they stand on the same ontological footing that is the natural
law participation in the eternal law.
What, then, can be said of the state specifically? Some commentators
have concluded that, in celebrating this plural social order, Pius XI
75
reached the view that the state is (simply) an instrument of said societies.
Although Pius moves in this direction, the thesis of organicity and of the
state as ontological perfection of the person, quoted and discussed above,
renders him a bridge figure in the progression under consideration here.
It took until 1939 and Pius XII's first encyclical, Summi Pontifcatus,for the
progression to reach its new term. There the new Pope described the "civitas," designed by the Creator for "the natural perfection of man, ' 76 as a
"quasi instrumentum." A summary of the reasons for the emergent clarity of
Pius XII on the diminished status of the state follow immediately, in the
next paragraphs of the encyclical: the totalizing state, the state that takes
over private initiatives, the state that forgets or denies that "man and the
family are by nature anterior to the State, and that the Creator has given to
both of them powers and rights and has assigned them a mission and a
charge that correspond to their natural requirements.

' 77

The succeeding social encyclicals of Blessed Pope John XXIII and
Pope Paul VI differ from those of the Piuses by virtue of their emphasis on
human rights and "social justice" (broadly understood), but beneath the
surface and frequently in the explicit statements of the texts they remain
75. See, e.g., W. Weber, Society and State as a Problem for the Church, in 10 His229, 242 (H. Jedin &J. Dolan eds., 1981).
76. Pius X1I, ENCYCLICAL LETTER SUMMI PONTIFICATUS 59 (Patrick McKinley
Brennan trans., 1939).
77. Id. 60, 61.
TORY OF THE CHURCH
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utterly traditional, discerning ruling power in man's natural law participation in the eternal law. 78 In the teachings of these two popes, the state is
an instrument called forth and limned by the natural law (and derivative
or correlative natural rights), and the natural law is the human person's
participation in the eternal law. In Pacem in Terris, for example, Pope John
XIII writes:
[M]ischief is often caused by erroneous opinions. Many people
think that the laws which govern men's relations with the State
are the same as those which regulate the blind, elemental forces
of the universe. But it is not so; the laws which govern men are
quite different. The Father of the universe has inscribed them in
man's nature, and that is where we must look for them; there and
nowhere else.
These laws clearly indicate how a man must behave toward
his fellows in society, and how the mutual relationships between
the members of a State and its officials are to be conducted ....
Now the order which prevails in human society is wholly in[S]uch an orcorporeal in nature. Its foundation is truth ....
der-universal, absolute, and immutable in its principles-finds
its source in the true, personal, and transcendent God. He is the
first truth, the sovereign good, and as such the deepest source
from which human society, if it is to be properly constituted, creative, and worthy of man's dignity, draws its genuine vitality. This
is what St. Thomas means when he says: "Human reason is the
standard which measures the degree of goodness of the human
will, and as such it derives from the eternal law, which is divine
reason ....Hence it is clear that the goodness of the human will
depends much more on the eternal law than on human reason."
Governmental authority.. . is a postulate of the moral order
and derives from God. Consequently, laws and decrees passed in
contravention of the moral order, and hence of the divine will,
can have no binding force in conscience, since "it is right to obey
God rather than men."
Indeed, the passing of such laws undermines the very nature
of authority and results in shameful abuse. As St. Thomas
teaches, "In regard to the second proposition, we maintain that
human law has the rationale of law in so far as it is in accordance
with right reason, and as such it obviously derives from eternal
law. A law which is at variance with reason is to that extent unjust
78. Rodger Charles, SJ., argues that natural law provides the coherent framework of Catholic social doctrine up to and including Vatican II. See generally RODGER CHARLES, THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF VATICAN 11:ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT

(1982).

This view is criticized in MICHAEL J. SCHUCK, THAT THEY BE ONE: THE

SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS
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and has no longer the rationale of law. It is rather an act of
79
violence."
When we reach the hundredth anniversary of Rerum Novarum and
Pope John Paul II's celebration of it in Centesimus Annus, his magna charta
on man, state, and society, we still have an instrumental state, alright, as we
have had since Pius XII in 1939. Now, however, we have one to be wary of.
John Paul II wrote disparagingly of "the social assistance state," "state administration," the state as a system of "bureaucratic control" and the state
as a "secular religion."80 The reasons for the Polish Pope's suspicion of
the modern state do not require elaboration. The resulting teaching is
clear: The state is an untrustworthy agent of civil society and particular
societies within it. Professor Hittinger explains: "In contrast to the classical or medieval conception of the civitas, the state in Centesimus is not the
locus or principal expression of cosmic harmony." 8 1 "[T]here is no theological mantle draped over the state. Indeed, nowhere in Centesimus can
there be found any reference to the political state's imaging of divine governance" 82-a result of the submersion and disappearance of the natural
law, a point to which I shall return. According to the magisterium ofJohn
Paul II, the state is limned by the principle of subsidiarity, understood as
follows, in terms that Taparelli would approve:
Subsidiarity, understood in the positive sense as economic, institu-

tional or juridical assistance offered to lesser social entities, entails a corresponding sense of negative implications that require
the State to refrain from anything that would de facto restrict the
existential space of the smaller essential cells of society. Their
83
initiative, freedom and responsibility must not be supplanted.
V.

A

PRESTATEMENT AND A RESTATEMENT

Before turning to assess the state of Benedict XVI's state vis-a-vis the
classical state of modern Catholic social doctrine, it will be helpful to have
in mind a crisp statement of the classical, pre-John Paul II Catholic account of man, state, and society. A statement that is crystal clear and is,
moreover, one that more than any other dictated the direction taken in
the social teachings of the Second Vatican Council, is the one developed
by Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), of whom Pope Paul VI was a disciple.
Maritain's mid-twentieth century account is a remarkable contrast to the
state as it has mutated in the teachings of John Paul II and Benedict XVI.
6, 7, 37, 38, 49, 51
79. JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLIcAL LETTER PACEM IN TERRiS
(1963).
25, 48, 49 (1991);
80. JOHN PAUL II, ENCYLCIAL LETTER CENTESiMUS ANNUS
see also Hittinger, supra note 55, at 967.
81. Hittinger, The Problem of the State in Centesimus Annus, supranote 55, at 974.
82. Id. at 966.
83.

COMPENDIUM,

supra note 2, at § 186.
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The reader of the magisterium's social teaching documents frequently cannot tell whether any given reference to the state-usually in
Latin "civitas" or "res publica' or "principatus"or "regnum" or "regimen civile

or the like-is a reference to the body politic under the legitimate authority of its leaders or is, rather, a narrower reference to only those leaders
possessed of legitimate authority and organized over a given political society. That is to say, one cannot tell whether "the state" is a whole, or is only
a part. On this cardinal point, Maritain was singularly clear. According to
Maritain, "the basic political reality is not the State, but the body politic
with its multifarious institutions, the multiple communities which it involves, and the moral community which grows out of it." 8 4 Maritain

continues:
The state is only that part of the body politic especially concerned with the maintenance of law, the promotion of the common welfare and public order, and the administration of public
affairs. The State is the part which specializes in the interests of
the whole. It is not a man or a body of men; it is a set of institutions combined into a topmost machine ....

The State is infer-

ior to the body politic as a whole, and is at the service of the body
85
politic as a whole.
Maritain refers to his theory of the state as "instrumentalist," 86 because it "regards the State as a part or an instrument of the body politic."
By insisting that the state is exactly an instrument or a part of a larger
whole, not a whole itself, Maritain assures that the state cannot claim to be
a person-a group person, that is, a unity of order distinct in dignity, possessed of its own rights.8

7

Having surveyed all the temptations to sover-

eign and irresponsible statecraft that must be resisted, Maritain concludes
that dignity can be predicated of the state only in virtue of its succeeding
in properly ordering the body politic of which it is a part:
Then only will the highest functions of the state-to ensure the
law and ensure and facilitate the free development of the body
politic-be restored, and the sense of the State regained by the
citizens. Then only will the State achieve its true dignity, which
comes not from power and prestige, but from the exercise of
88
justice.
Many of those people who remember and celebrate Maritain's work
do so for its elaboration of a robust Thomistic account of natural human
rights. Whatever one's judgment on the bonafides of a Thomistic defense
84. MARITAIN, supra note 11, at 202.
85. Id. at 12, 13.
86. Id. at 13.
87. Id. at 13-14.
88. Id. at 19.
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of natural rights, one must remember what many natural-rights admirers
forget, to wit, the following linkage, indeed priority:
[The] true philosophy of the rights of the human person is based
upon the true idea of natural law . .

.

. The same natural law

which lays down our most fundamental duties, and in virtue of
which every law is binding, is the very law which assigns us our
fundamental rights.

89

Natural law, along with the derivative natural rights, sets the basic
terms according to which justice is to be done by the state in and for political society, the justice by which the state earns its dignity. And for Maritain, as for Leo, the natural law is true law and binding in virtue of the fact
that it is not made by human reason, but promulgated in man, a participation in the eternal law: "Natural Law obliges by virtue of Eternal Law. It is
from the divine reason that it possesses its rational character, and consequently, it is from divine reason that it possesses its genuine nature as law
and its obligatory character." 90 Man has been given a share in providential government; all authority comes from God.
Man's participation in the divine ruling authority by way of the natural law is in the background, as it were, counterbalancing or, perhaps better, motivating Maritain's instrumentalist theory of the state. Ruling power
is transmitted from God through the people, "from below upwards" (as Maritain says, borrowing a phrase from Pius XII),91 coming to rest from time
to time in the state, that part of the united people capable of and tasked
with doing justice, as well as in the plural authorities of diverse societies.
Although Maritain seems, interestingly, never to have used the term subsidiarity, the political landscape he surveys is one of plural societies respecting and, as necessary, assisting one another.9 2 Throughout the social
landscape (except that portion which is the Church), the people through
their authoritative representatives have genuine ruling power from God,
and they earn in fact the dignity they have in potency by implementing the
natural law and doingjustice. The state is at once servant and participated
divine ruler.
It is this latter fact that prevents Maritain from going all the way in the
direction taken by that estimable socialist Harold Laski, who described the
state as a "public service corporation," one corporation among many
others. 93 Maritain notes Laski's and his own convergence, "from quite dif89. Id. at 84, 95.
90. Jacques Maritain, Natural Law and Moral Law, in MORAL PRINCIPLES OF AcTION 62, 67 (Ruth Nanda Ashen ed., 1952).
91. JACQUES MARITAIN, INTEGRAL HUMANISM 251 n.10 (1936). This part of the
note was added by Maritain in a revision to INTEGRAL HUMANISM (1936), based on
Pius XII's October 2, 1945, discourse to the Tribunal of the Sacred Roman Rota.
92. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Sovereign States? The State of the Questionfrom
a Catholic Perspective, in FAITH AND LAw (Robert Cochran ed., forthcoming 2007).
93. MARITAIN, supra note 11, at 12 n.8.
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ferent, even conflicting, lines of thought," on a social landscape composed
of plural societies, but the different line by which Maritain gets there assures that a purely workaday image of the instrumental state is not sufficient. 94 Though less enthusiastically than his contemporaries Heinrich

Rommen and Johannes Messner, Maritain holds that the state is unique
among authorities inasmuch as its end is not a partial good, but instead
the common good of political society. 95 The Thomistic idea of a common
good is alien to Laski's cosmos, as is the claim that all authority is by way of
participation in the Eternal Law. The latter delivers an instrumental state
that enjoys the dignity of participated regality. Maritain's exegesis of Matthew 12:21's admonition to render unto Caesar respects the fact that what
96
ruling authority Caesar enjoys is from God.

VI.

NATURAL LAw: Quo vADis?

For Maritain, along with the rest of the pre-John Paul II Catholic tradition in the twentieth century, rootedness in and limitation by the natural
law (and correlative or derivative natural rights) guaranteed safe passage
from a sacred, organic state to a more modest, instrumentalist state. I say
pre-John Paul II Catholic tradition because, while no one can suspectJohn
Paul of being a relativist, Centesimus Annus makes absolutely no mention of
the natural law. John Paul's encyclical celebrates Rerum Novarum without
so much as a mention of the ontologico-legal linchpin of the entire Leonine corpus that the Piuses, John XXIII, and Paul VI appropriated and
refined. Man's natural law participation in the eternal law is nowhere to
be found in Centesiumus Annus.
Admittedly, in the encyclical Veritatis Splendor published two years
later, in response to growing sectors of putatively Catholic moral theology
and philosophy that denied that human ethical judgments can be rooted
in an objective moral order, and one that exceeds what is merely "natural,"
the natural law figures prominently. The term "participated theonomy" is
used to describe the human person's access, through reason, to God's rational will for his creatures. Though the terminology differs in various
ways from what was traditional, 97 the central fact is that, in the context of
moral theology and philosophy, John Paul II was unequivocal that humans
are possessed of and measured by a legal, moral norm from God, even
though in his discussion of the state in Centesimus Annus, John Paul II gives
not even glancing attention to the ontologico-legal scaffolding of the Leonine synthesis.
94. Id. at 23 n.14.
95. Id. at 23-24; cf

JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS: NATURAL LAW IN THE

542 (3d ed., 1965);
THOUGHT 306-14 (1945).
WESTERN WORLD

HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC

96. SeeJACQUES MARITAIN, THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT CAESAR'S

2 (1930).

97. See Hittinger, supra note 6, at xxxviii-xli.
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Of course, inasmuch as every rational human can reach a judgment
according to the natural law for purposes of Veritatis Splendor, the Venn
diagrams assure that the subset of humans invested with civil authority are
ontologically equipped, if you will, to reach judgments according to the
same natural law (and proceed to give them coercive effect in the name of
the state). Still, John Paul's silence in Centesimus Annus is signal.
Does Deus Caritas echo this silence? As I mentioned in summarizing
the encyclical's stance on the state, Benedict states that "[t]he Church's
social teaching argues on the basis of reason and natural law, namely, on
the basis of what is in accord with the nature of every human being," "a
ratione et a naturali iure, id est ab eo quod congruit naturae cuiusque personae

humanae."9 8 This is a statement about the sources of the Church's social
doctrine on man, society, the state and so forth. Is the referenced natural
law the one as understood by St. Thomas, Leo, Maritain, et al.? Does Benedict teach that those possessed of civil authority participate, by way of the
natural law, in the eternal law? It is not clear that he does, for the following reasons, first from the encyclical itself.
First, Benedict's distance from the classical thesis on natural law is
suggested in the curious phraseology just quoted: "a ratione et a naturali
iure, id est ab eo quod congruit naturae cuiusque personae humanae." Does not

the Pope thus reduce the "natural law" to what reason finds congruent
with human nature? Recall from my earlier summary that the Pope answers the question, "What is justice?" in the following way: "The problem is
one of practical reason." 99 To which the Thomist-Leonine reply would be,
'Yes, so long as practical reason is understood to be reaching a judgment
in accord with a law that is a participation in the divine governance."
Second, and in relation to this, notice that Benedict's identifying, as
he does in Deus Caritas,justice as "the end and intrinsic criterion" of all
politics, is pure Aristotle, lacking the Thomist overlay-or, rather, scaffolding-of law, natural and eternal. This interpretation of the language of
Benedict's encyclical is fortified by the following sentence from Cardinal
Ratzinger: "Catholic theology has since the later Middle Ages, with the
acceptance of Aristotle and his idea of natural law ... "100 The rest of the
sentence following the ellipsis does not matter here. Though Aristotle did
have a concept of nature, Aristotle did not have a concept of the natural
law or of the eternal law, nor could he have had, for he lacked the idea of
a personal God ruling providentially and legislatively over his rational
creatures.
Benedict's preference for a non-Thomistic idiom is concessum, as is the
propriety of any pope's choosing to use non-traditional concepts that are
capable of effectively mediating (developing) the judgments of the magisterial tradition. Since what the Church asks of the faithful is a religiosum
98.

BENEDICT

XVI, DEUS

CARITAS

EsT, supra note 16,

28.

99. Id.
100.
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obsequium as to the judgments (not the concepts) of the teachings, we must
ask whether Benedict's judgment advanced in Deus Caritasis that civil rulers are not capable of taking decisions according to a true law, that is, the
natural law that is not diverse from the eternal law. 10 1
What further light I can shed on this question is derived from several
additional pre-pontificate texts by Joseph Ratzinger, the first one dealing
at some length with the natural law itself. In a talk given at the Catholic
Academy of Bavaria in January 2004, under the provocative title, "What
Keeps the World Together: The Prepolitical Moral Foundations of a Free
State," Benedict set as his task to identify "genuinely evidential valuesvalues sufficiently strong to provide motivation and sufficiently capable of
being implemented."' 0 2 He then offered a brief (and, by his own admission, incomplete) history of natural law theorizing, mentioning Gratian,
Ulpian, Vitoria, Pufendorf, Grotius, and others, but not Aquinas, and
never the eternal law, let alone a doctrine of participation. Here is Cardinal Ratzinger's statement, on that occasion, about the status, if you will, of
the natural law:
Natural law has remained-especially in the Catholic Churchone element in the arsenal of arguments in conversations with
secular society and with other communities of faith, appealing to
shared reason in the attempt to discern the basis of a consensus
about ethical principles of law in a pluralistic, secular society.
Unfortunately, this instrument has become blunt, and that is why
I do not wish to employ it to support my arguments in this discussion. The idea of natural law presupposed a concept of "nature"
in which nature and reason interlock: nature itself is rational.
The victory of the theory of evolution has meant the end of this
view of nature .... [The] last surviving element [of the doctrine
of natural law] is human rights . . . . Perhaps the doctrine of

human rights ought today to be complemented by a doctrine of
0
human obligations and human limits.'

3

What is clear in this text is that in 2004 Cardinal Ratzinger considered
"natural law" unavailing in public discourse, at least ad extra. It remains
ambiguous in this text whether Ratzinger rejects the Thomist thesis on
natural (and eternal) law.
As it did in the entire body of teaching of the Second Vatican Council, democracy goes unmentioned in Deus Caritas. Democracy, however,
was a favorite Ratzinger puzzle. The nerve of the problem, to which the
Cardinal returned time and time again, is that while, on the one hand,
democracy has the virtue of allowing all people to participate in shaping
101. See Aidan Nichols, Joseph Ratzinger's Theology of Political Ethics, 68
BLACKFRIARs
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380, 390-92 (1987).
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the shared life, on the other hand, democracy as it is practiced seems almost universally to deny that there is a good that can be imposed by the
leaders to whom the population has handed over its power (for a term of
years). On the one hand, then:
The participation of everyone in democracy is the hallmark of
freedom. No one is to be merely the object of rule by others or
only a person under control; everyone ought to be able to make a
voluntary contribution to the totality of political activity. We can
all be free citizens only if we have a genuine share in decision
making. The real goal of participation in power is thus universal
10 4
freedom and equality.
On the other hand, "the modern concept of democracy seems indissolubly linked to that of relativism. It is relativism that appears to be the
real guarantee of freedom and especially of the very heart of human freedom, namely, freedom of religion and conscience." Ratzinger continues
immediately: "We would all agree on this today. Yet, if we look more
closely, we are surely obliged to ask: Must there not be a nonrelativistic
kernel in democracy too?" Ratzinger answers his own question as follows:
"For is not democracy ultimately constructed around human rights that
are inviolable? Does not democracy appear necessary precisely in order to
guarantee and protect these rights? Human rights are not subject to any demandforpluralism and tolerance ... "105 But what, Ratzinger goes on to ask,

is the foundation of these?
Here is where things get really interesting, especially as Ratzinger uses
Jacques Maritain's ideas to help answer the question. The insight that relativists "make the majority a kind of divinity against which no further appeal is possible," Ratzinger reports, "led Jacques Maritain to develop a
political philosophy that attempts to draw on the great intuitions of the
Bible and make those fruitful for political theory." 10 6 Ratzinger continues, observing that on Maritain's view, "Christianity is considered ... as
the source of knowledge, antecedent to the political action on which it
sheds light .... The truth about the good supplied by the Christian tradition becomes an insight of reason and hence a rational principle ....
Naturally, this presupposes a certain amount of optimism about the evidential character of morality and of Christianity."'1 7 Having surveyed a
range of political theories (including, among the "relativists," Hans Kelsen
and Richard Rorty), Cardinal Ratzinger concludes: "Maritain has, [among
the theories considered], the greatest confidence in the rational evidential
quality of the moral truth of Christianity and of the Christian image of
08
God."1
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
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Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

53.
55 (emphasis added).
63.
64.
67.
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Maritain's position on the relationship between natural moral philosophy and Catholic theology is complex in a way I cannot elaborate here,
so I shall simply assert that Cardinal Ratzinger is right to find in Maritain
an ally for the thesis that, as a matter of history, Christianity has been necessary for mankind to develop and implement a practical moral science
based on nature and natural law. The light and grace of the Gospel have
illuminated and enlivened what would otherwise have remained obscure
and largely a matter of theory (rather than of practice). 10 9 For Maritain,
however, the foundation of morality (and thence of the state) is not just
the Christian revelation and theology, but also the natural law (along with
natural rights) that is a participated share in the eternal law. It is the rational creature's being possessed of a genuine law according to which he
can make a judgment that constitutes the basis of politics and positive
law-a fact, according to Maitain, that the Church has helped mankind
to discover. For Maritain, rulers not possessed of a natural law according
to which to make legal judgments cannot but make lawless judgments. 1 0
Against the background developed here, is it not puzzling to read in
Deus Caritas that "the formation ofjust structures... belongs to the world
of politics, the sphere of the autonomous use of reason," "rationissui ipsius

consciae?" This is ajuncture at which a Pope who affirms the existence of a
natural law that is a participation in the eternal law might well have men-

tioned it. Yes, politics should be based on "autonomous reason," but reason reaching judgments according to a received law-or so the tradition
taught.
VII.

LAWLESS POLITICS?

We can move toward a conclusion by filling out Benedict's positive
contribution to our inquiry into the ontological density of the state in
modern Catholic social doctrine. A recurrent thesis in Benedict's writings
is that "the state is not itself the source of truth and morality," a nice formulation of the anti-relativist thesis, which he also makes by saying that the
state cannot "produce truth via the majority."' 1 1 With this Ratzinger combines the thesis that, because freedom for everyone cannot be achieved if
the state does not have "contents" to shape its orderings, "the state must
receive from outside itself the essential measure of knowledge and truth
with respect to that which is good." 1 2 That "outside," Ratzinger continues, might ideally be "the pure insight of reason," but in actual fact is from
109. SeeJACQUES MARITAIN, CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY 42-56 (1945) (examining influence of Christianity on secular conscience). On the necessity of moral
philosophy's being subalternated to theology if it is to be adequate to its object, see
generally JACQUES MARITAIN, SCIENCE AND WISDOM (1940).
110. See Maritain, supra note 90, at 67.
111. RATZINGER, VALUES IN A TIME OF UPHEAVAL, supra note 15, at 68.
112. Id.
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"reason that has come to maturity in the historical form of faith," the Catholic faith.' 1 3 This is the point on which Benedict has an ally in Maritain.
Let us stipulate, first, that Church and state are distinct and, second,
that the Church has things to teach the state that the state or body politic
could not as a matter of contingent fact discover for itself. In arguing the
different point that the state must receive its contents and direction from
"outside" itself (indeed, from the Church, among others), however, does
not Benedict exclude the possibility that qua social creatures under the
natural law, humans themselves are, as they associate and then create and
designate authorities, doing something that is, through participation,
proper to them? Law is not a predicate of the human person, but when
humans form societies and create authorities and institutions that we refer
to as "the state," one necessary source of the authority of those who rule in
political society is the natural law promulgated in their very selves. It is by
virtue of human persons' participation in the eternal law that they are
potentially legitimate rulers. (They must also be duly designated). Theirs
is a state whose servant-ruling quality enjoys participated regal dignity.
Who, then, are these ruling people Benedict imagines receiving direction
from the Church, but not anchored in the eternal law? Whence comes
their authority to rule with law?
I mentioned above Pope John Paul II's inconstancy with respect to
the natural law as between Centesimus Annus in 1991 and two years later
Veritatis Splendor in 1993. Another two years later, in 1995, John Paul II
published Evangelium Vitae, and by then the Pope's focus, in the encyclical
decrying the "culture of death," was the way in which the modern state
had become the enemy of the human rights on which it, as a condition of
its laicization by the Church, was to be based. The story told in Evangelium
1 14
ReVitae is one of "betrayal," a word used six times in the document.
jecting the sufficiency of majority will, the Pope wrote that the values that
inform democratic living must respect the dignity of the human person.
He continued: "The basis of these values cannot be provisional and
changeable 'majority' opinions, but only the acknowledgment of an objective moral law which, as the natural law written in the human heart, is the
obligatory point of reference for civil law itself." 115 What the Holy See's
English translation renders as "natural law" is "moralis lex," not lex naturalis,
but the Pope's intent is clear. 1 6 John Paul also quotes Pacem in Terris and
even Aquinas himself to the effect that putative law that violates the natu17
ral law which "derives from the eternal law is really no law at all."'
But was it by then too late to put Humpty Dumpty back together
again? Even at the time of writing Centesimus Annus, John Paul II felt con113. Id. at 68-69.
114. See Hittinger, supra note 6, at 32.
115. JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETrER EVANGELIUM VITAE 70 (1995).
116. See HITrINGER, supra note 12, at xxxix-xli.
117. JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELiUM VITAE, supra note 115, 71-72.
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strained to acknowledge that persons who are "convinced that they know
the truth and firmly adhere to it are considered unreliable from a democratic point of view." 1 18 Is it a surprise that natural rights disconnected
from the natural law wither like cut flowers? John Paul's ontologico-legal
half-way house proved not to be habitable. But what of Benedict's plainspoken plea for non-relativist politics? As John Paul II lay dying, Cardinal
Ratzinger told the Benedictine monks at Subiaco that, affirming as she
does that the world comes from reason, the divine Logos, and is therefore
reasonable, the Church, "from the purely philosophical point of view,
[has] really good cards to play." 1 19 But do these include an account of a
universal moral norm that is a law? This is the question.
Cardinal Ratzinger's frequent reminders that society must always be
in the process of being built up again, that the state is inevitably a "societas
imperfecta," that there are limits to what we can achieve in the social order,
that mechanisms of social justice are inherently insufficient, that social
charity is among man's ineliminable needs-these are salutary hedges
against utopian overreaching by a self-impressed state 120 against people
and supreme courts willing putatively to invest instruments of rule with
sovereignty and sovereign dignity, and without even glancing attention to
a received law and ruling power. Also welcome is Benedict's clear insight
that both the right sort of culture and preexisting societies shaped by such
culture are necessary to sustain (and limit) the work of the state. When,
however, Cardinal Ratzinger asserts that "the state is not itself the sacred
power but simply an order that finds its limit in a faith that worships, not
the state, but a God who stands over against it and judges it," 12 1 has not
the basis of authoritative rule been evacuated? While a Cardinal, Ratzinger liked to turn Grotius's "etsi Deus non daretur," even if God did not
exist, on its head, asking the non-believer to take a gamble and act as if
God does exist. 12 2 But does this not leave untouched the question of the
legal basis of the state's authority to make law? God "stands over against
123
[the state] and judges it," but on what basis does He judge?
46.
JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 80,
119. Joseph Ratzinger, Address at the Convent of Saint Scholastica in Subiaco, Italy
118.

(July 29, 2005), available at http://www.zenit.org/english/visualizza.phtml?sid=
74864.
120. See, e.g., RATZINGER, CHURCH, ECUMENISM AND POLITICS, supra note 100, at
214, 217.
121. JOSEPH RATZINGER, SALT OF THE EARTH 240 (1996).
122. See, e.g., JOSEPH RATZINGER, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CRsIS OF CULTURES 60
(2005).
123. Hittinger, The Problem of the State in Centesimus Annus, supra note 55, at
989 n.52. The omission of "natural law" language from papal teaching documents
may be a matter of rhetorical strategy, but in Catholic moral theology more gener-

ally, the refusal to predicate "law" of nature is not merely rhetorical. See, e.g., id.
Professor Hittinger notes that Cardinal Ratzinger was "more comfortable with the
scholastic language of natural law than [was] Pope John Paul Il." Id. at 988. With
increasing frequency in addresses delivered after this paper was completed, Pope
Benedict has considered the place of the "natural law" in guiding and limiting
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One can affirm that the Church is sacred in a way that the state, properly understood, is not, without having to deny that the state is possessed
of a share of sacred ruling authority. If what authority for rule the state
possesses is in no way sacred, however, then it can be no part of the divine
ruling power. Do we humans have a self-possessed power to rule, a rival to
the divine? If we have not received a law, then on the basis of what do we
proceed to make law? In one of my favorite lines of all time, Justice
1 24
Antonin Scalia opined that "God," not man, "applies the natural law."
If that be true, what, then, do we do? Inasmuch as a devoutly Catholic
Justice of the Supreme Court has consigned us to a fate without benefit of
the natural law, the question is not merely speculative.
social ordering and human living. See, e.g., Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the
Participantsin the InternationalCongress on NaturalMoral Law (Feb. 12, 2007), available at www.vatican.va/holyjather/benedict.xvi/speeches/2007/february/documents/hf-ben-xvi-spe_20070212_pul-en.html and Address of His Holiness Benedict
XVI to the Participantsin the 56th National Study Congress Organized by the Union of
Italian CatholicJurists (Dec. 9, 2006), available at www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict-xvi/speeches/2006/december/index_en.htm. In future work, I intend to
pursue the question of the legality of the moral norms Pope Benedict refers to
under the label "natural law."
124. Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, The Common Christian Good, Speech at the Gregorianum University Symposium on Left, Right, and the Common Good (May 2, 1996), available at http://www.learnedhand.com/scalia.htm.
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